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The  ninth  edition  of  the  NBER Macroeconomics  Annual  presents,  once 
again,  a  mixture  of  applied  frontier  research  and  analyses  of  current 
macroeconomic  problems. 
The  first paper  by  Christina Romer and  David  Romer, "What  Ends 
Recessions?"  combines  frontier research with  an analysis  of the  role of 
the  Federal  Reserve  in  stabilizing  output.  It  starts  by  providing  a 
description  of what  happened  to the federal funds  rate and to the ratio 
of the  high  employment  surplus  to potential  GDP during  the  postwar 
recessions.  Romer  and  Romer  show  that  the  nominal  and  the  real 
federal  funds  rate  consistently  fell  between  peaks  and  troughs.  The 
evidence  on fiscal policy is more mixed, but there is a reasonably strong 
tendency  for the ratio of the full employment  surplus  to potential  GDP 
to fall between  two  quarters before the trough and the quarter after the 
trough.  Thus,  policy,  but  particularly  monetary  policy,  becomes  more 
expansionary  as the economy  declines  toward  a trough  in activity. 
Next,  Romer  and  Romer  show  that  these  expansionary  movements 
are intentional. The evidence  is particularly clear in the case of monetary 
policy  because  the  Federal  Reserve  Minutes  show  how  keenly  aware 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board  was  of  changes  in  economic  activity  and 
how  intent  it  was  on  stabilizing  it.  Even  in  the  case  of  fiscal policy, 
Romer and Romer show  that the federal government  was  able in some 
recessions  to  react  sufficiently  quickly  that  there  were  deliberately 
antirecessionary  small increases  in government  spending  around  most 
troughs. 
The subsequent,  substantially more controversial, sections try to gauge 
the  extent  to  which  these  countercyclical  actions  had  their  desired 
effect,  i.e.,  the  degree  to  which  they  brought  forth  a  more  rapid 
recovery.  This  is  done  in  two  stages.  In  the  first, Romer  and  Romer 
estimate  policy  multipliers  by  running  either  ordinary  least  squares  or 
instrumental  variable regressions  of output  growth  on policy  variables. 2 ?  FISCHER  &  ROTEMBERG 
Whether  these  estimates  really represent  policy  multipliers  or whether 
they  capture  some  endogenous  reaction by the  Fed was  the  subject of 
much  discussion  at the  conference.  While  this issue  was  not  settled,  it 
seems  that an analysis  of Fed intentions  like that pursued  in this paper 
will be essential  for reaching  a conclusion. 
In the second  stage, Romer and Romer use these  policy multipliers to 
measure  the  extent  to which  output  growth  in  the  four  quarters after 
the  trough  exceeds  what  it would  have  been  had  interest  rates  (and 
fiscal policy)  remained  on a nonexpansionary  "baseline"  path. Because 
the policy  multipliers  they  estimate  for monetary  policy  are large, they 
estimate  that  the  reductions  in  interest  rates  after  the  peak  have  a 
substantial effect on output  growth.  According  to their estimates,  these 
add between  1.5% and 3% to the growth  in output  during the first year 
after  the  trough.  Thus,  they  attribute  most  of  the  unusually  large 
growth  of gross domestic  product (GDP) in recoveries to the expansion- 
ary monetary  policy  that is pursued  between  peaks and troughs. 
The paper by Eric Leeper and  Christopher  Sims, "Toward  a Modern 
Macroeconomic  Model  Usable  for Policy  Analysis,"  also  tries to  gauge 
the role of policy,  though  it uses  a very  different methodology.  It uses 
maximum  likelihood  to estimate  the parameters of an extremely  tightly 
parameterized  model  This  model  has  much  in  common  with  real 
business  cycle  models,  although  it  also  allows  for  sticky  prices  and 
wages.  The  existence  of  these  sticky  prices  and  wages  means  that 
government  policy,  and  monetary  policy  in  particular, is quite  potent. 
Thus,  their  model  is  usable  for understanding  the  role  these  policies 
have  had  in  generating  economic  fluctuations.  What  is  notable  about 
the methods  proposed  in this paper is that they can in principle be fit to 
as much  data as is usually  considered  in large macroeconomic  models 
even  though  the model  is much  more tightly  parametrized. 
What the Leeper-Sims  model  has in common  with real business  cycle 
models  is the notion  that consumption  and labor supply  are determined 
by a representative  agent  with  very  simple  preferences  and  that factor 
demands  are determined  by a representative  perfectly  competitive  firm 
whose  technology  takes a very stripped-down  form. The model  also has 
a  fairly  large  number  of  structural  disturbances,  each  of  which  is 
assumed  to follow  a first-order autoregressive  process. 
In  the  first  version  of  the  model,  Sims  and  Leeper  fit  only  the 
behavior  of  consumption,  investment,  and  hours.  In this  version  they 
find three real shocks  that account  for the bulk of their fluctuations.  In 
the second  version,  they also include  a measure  of real wages,  the GDP 
deflator,  real  government  purchases,  real  government  revenues,  the Editorial 3 
monetary  base,  the  three-month  Treasury Bill rate, and  the  size  of the 
population.  They  obtain  more  satisfactory  estimates  for  this  second 
version  when  prices and wages  are allowed  to be sticky. The estimated 
parameters then  imply  that monetary  policy  is extremely  potent.  How- 
ever, their estimates  also imply  that monetary  policy  shocks  have been 
small in their sample  so that monetary  policy  shocks have  made  only  a 
modest  contribution  to  output  volatility.  While  the  results  are  still 
preliminary,  this  paper  suggests  a  potentially  promising  new  way  of 
modeling  the aggregate  economy. 
Alan  Auerbach's  paper,  "The  U.S.  Fiscal  Problem: Where  We  Are, 
How  We Got Here, and Where We're Going," starts from the  question 
of why  large deficit reduction  policies-the  1990 $500 billion  Bush tax 
bill, followed  by the 1993 $500 billion Clinton tax package-have  had so 
little  apparent  success  in  reducing  the  deficit.  Despite  the  more  than 
$100 billion per annum  average reduction  in the deficit claimed by each 
tax bill, the U.S. budget  deficit is still around $200 billion per annum,  or 
3% of  GDP. In addition,  Auerbach  asks how  the  current  path  of  U.S. 
fiscal policy  has been  affected by the  Clinton  tax package  and whether 
it is sustainable. 
Auerbach shows  that big errors have been  made  in predicting  future 
budget  deficits.  He  focuses  on  the  projections  of  the  Congressional 
Budget  Office (CBO). Figure 2 shows  most  clearly what  was  predicted 
to have happened:  The solid line gives the projections of future budgets 
made  six years before the specified  date, and the dashed  line shows  the 
impact  of  subsequent  policy  decisions.  Given  those  projections  and 
subsequent  policv  decisions,  the budget  should  have been  in surplus in 
1991  and  1992,  and  again  between  1994  and  1996. But,  as  Figure  3 
shows,  there was  a forecast error for 1992 of nearly $300 billion. 
Among  the  valuable  contributions  of  this  paper  is the  detailed  pre- 
sentation  of the projection  methods  of the CBO. Using  CBO methodol- 
ogy,  Auerbach  breaks  the  forecasting  errors for  each  year  down  into 
three  categories,  economic,  technical,  and  interest,  but  he  finds  no 
single  smoking  gun-the  largest  single  error arises  from  the  savings 
and loan bailout. Auerbach discusses  the question  of whether  there is a 
systematic  optimistic  bias  in  the  CBO's  projection  methods  and 
mentions  the failure to include  provisions  for emergency  spending,  but 
he concludes  here  too that there is no clear simple  mistake. 
Auerbach then  examines  the different budget  rules that Congress has 
imposed  on  itself  to  try  to  bring  the  deficit  under  control.  Each  of 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  and  the  1990 Budget  Enforcement  Act in- 
cludes  incentives  for  shifting  spending  between  years.  While  he 4 ?  FISCHER  &  ROTEMBERG 
discusses  biases  induced  by  these  laws,  Auerbach  is  skeptical  that  a 
much better budget  rule could have been  devised,  pointing  out that it is 
always  possible  to  change  the  budget  deficit  through  economically 
equivalent  and legitimate  budgetary  adjustments. 
The Clinton tax package has helped  reduce the budget  deficit, though 
a  large  share  of  the  improved  deficit  picture  results  from  ongoing 
spending  cuts, mostly  for defense.  Finally, Auerbach's projections,  like 
those  of the CBO, show  the budget  deficit beginning  to increase toward 
the end  of this decade.  The unfortunate  news  is that Auerbach projects 
that  very  large  cuts  in  the  primary  (noninterest)  budget  deficit  are 
needed  if fiscal policy  is to be put on a sustainable basis. 
The Auerbach paper  presents  mainly  bad news.  Some  of the  discus- 
sants  thought  it was  unduly  pessimistic.  Of  course,  one  could  always 
hope  that  the  excessive  optimism  in  earlier  forecasts  is  now  being 
replaced by excessive  pessimism-but  that is surely a very bad basis on 
which  to make policy  decisions. 
In  "Reconsidering  the  Costs  of  Business  Cycles  with  Incomplete 
Markets," Andrew  Atkeson  and  Christopher  Phelan  study  the  welfare 
consequences  of output  volatility.  Lucas (1987) showed  that the volatil- 
ity  of  aggregate  consumption  would  not  be  very  costly  if  it  affected 
everybody's  consumption  equally  and  if  the  typical  consumer  had  a 
plausible level  of risk aversion. Atkeson and Phelan investigate  whether 
the volatility  of aggregate  consumption  is more costly in models  where 
individual  consumption  is  much  more  volatile  than  aggregate  con- 
sumption  because  insurance markets are incomplete.  They find that this 
is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Surprisingly,  the  benefits  of  stabilizing 
aggregate  consumption  may actually be smaller under  incomplete  mar- 
kets than under  complete  markets. 
The reason,  at Atkeson  and  Phelan  show,  is that the  stabilization  of 
aggregate  consumption  need  not  stabilize  individual  consumption  at 
all; instead,  it may  just  reduce  the  correlation  of individual  consump- 
tion movements.  They show  this by considering  a model where  individ- 
ual firms are subject to an unverifiable  idiosyncratic  technology  shock. 
Because  the  shocks  are unverifiable,  wages  do  not  adjust; instead,  the 
firm responds  to a negative  shock by laying  off workers.  Of course, the 
fraction of workers  that is laid off depends  on  the wage  that is agreed 
on beforehand,  and this wage  depends  in turn on whether  the govern- 
ment  stabilizes  aggregate  output  or not.  In the  example  they  present, 
government  stabilization  leads  to a higher  equilibrium wage  so that, as 
a result,  the  probability  of becoming  laid  off remains  the  same.  Thus, 
the  stabilization  of  aggregate  output  affects  only  the  correlation  of 
individual  incomes. Editorial 5 
Even  then,  the  stabilization  will  have  effects  on  asset  prices.  In 
particular,  stabilization  of  aggregate  output  is  likely  to  stabilize  bond 
and  stock returns,  and  this  stabilization  could  have  important  welfare 
consequences.  However,  Atkeson  and  Phelan  show  that  these  asset 
price  consequences  need  not  have  important  welfare  effects  either.  In 
their model,  the welfare  effects of these  asset price consequences  hinge 
crucially on the extent  to which  bond  returns are stabilized (so that the 
cost of borrowing  ceases to vary over the business  cycle). Because actual 
bond  returns  are not  very  variable  in  the  U.S.  economy,  the  benefits 
from this stabilization would  likely be meager. 
John  Page's  paper  on  the  East Asian  miracle  draws  on  the  major 
study  that he led recently  for the World Bank. The underlying  question 
is  whether  the  high  growing  East  Asian  economies  succeeded  by 
following  the  orthodox  growth  strategy  recommended  by  the  interna- 
tional  agencies  and  neoclassical  economists,  or whether-as  critics of 
that  view  such  as  Alice  Amsden  and  Robert  Wade  contend-they 
succeeded  because  they  intervened  extensively.  The critics' view  of the 
East  Asian  strategy  is  summarized  by  Amsden's  memorable  phrase, 
"getting  the prices wrong." 
Page  examines  policies  and  performance  in eight  HPAEs-high  per- 
forming  Asian  economies:  Japan; the  four tigers  of Hong  Kong,  South 
Korea, Singapore,  and Taiwan; and  Indonesia,  Malaysia, and  Thailand. 
The most  spectacular performer of recent years, China, is excluded. 
The  miracle  in  these  economies  is  twofold:  Growth  has  been  ex- 
tremely  rapid, and  it has been  equitable.  In some  cases,  notably  Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Taiwan, productivity  growth  has been  high; in others, 
such  as Singapore,  it has been  slow  or negative.  Indeed,  in a paper  in 
the  1992  NBER Macroeconomics  Annual,  Alwyn  Young  contrasted  the 
performance  of  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore,  arguing  that  Singapore 
growth  was  extensive  and that it could  not continue  in that way.  Page 
confirms that the rapid growth  of Indonesia,  Malaysia, and Singapore  is 
due  entirely  to  high  rates of  factor accumulation.  He  takes  the  differ- 
ence  in  productivity  performance  to  show  that  the  HPAEs have  fol- 
lowed  different  routes  to  high  growth.  He  also  shows  that  even  the 
negative  growth  rates of productivity  in some  of the HPAEs are above 
those  of most  developing  economies. 
Page then  draws four lessons  from the history of the HPAEs. Two are 
conventional:  Maintenance  of macroeconomic  stability is necessary  for 
growth;  and  broad-based  education,  "universal  primary  and  broadly 
based  secondary  education  combined  with  restraint of public subsidies 
to  higher  education,"  makes  a  major  contribution.  Everyone  would 
agree  so  far. The  third  lesson  that  Page  draws  is  that  promotion  of 6 *  FISCHER  &  ROTEMBERG 
manufactured  exports contributed  significantly  to growth.  The fourth is 
that  industrial  policies-picking  of  winners  and  losers,  other  than  on 
the basis of export promotion-did  not. 
The paper's conclusion  that export orientation  is the key ingredient  is 
based  on regressions  showing  that outwardly  oriented  policies  support 
growth. The claim that industrial policies failed is based on a calculation 
that the composition  of industrial  production  had relatively  little effect 
on  growth.  More  detailed  evidence  in  support  of  these  conclusions  is 
included  in the book  on which  the paper draws. 
The  paper  may  seem  to  sidestep  the  question  of  whether  countries 
have  benefitted  from nonmarket  friendly  interventions,  such  as direct 
credit allocation. It does  not: While the regression  evidence  on outward 
orientation  implies  that  it is better  not  to  distort  relative  prices,  Page 
concedes  that  selective  interventions  in  favor  of  exports  have  suc- 
ceeded.  He  then  tries  to  answer  the  question  of  how  the  HPAEs 
avoided  having  the benefits  captured by the participants. His answer  is 
that the bureaucracies  in  several  countries  successfully  set  up  contests 
based  on  performance  in global markets. As Page  notes,  running  such 
contests  successfully  requires  a high  level  of  government  institutional 
capacity. 
Virtually all the literature on the transition process in Eastern Europe 
and  the  former  Soviet  Union  is  descriptive  or  prescriptive.  In  their 
paper,  "On  the  Speed  of  Transition  in  Central  Europe,"  Philippe 
Aghion  and Olivier Blanchard develop  a relatively  simple model  of the 
transition  process  designed  to  provide  a systematic  basis  for thinking 
about transition policies. 
They start from the stylized  facts in Poland, where  GDP fell for three 
years, and has now  started growing.  Unemployment  has increased over 
the years, to the point where  it is now  16%. The state sector has shrunk, 
and the private sector has grown  fast. However,  Aghion  and Blanchard 
point  to two  problems  in  the  restructuring  process: The private  sector 
has  essentially  stopped  expanding,  and  its  growth  has  been  almost 
entirely  in very  small firms, mostly  in  the  services  sector. Further, the 
privatization  process in Poland  has been  very  slow. 
The Aghion-Blanchard  model  assumes  that productivity  in the  state 
sector  is  lower  than  that  in  the  private  sector.  Each  state  firm  can 
privatize  or restructure by downsizing,  in the process  having  its work- 
ers' productivity  increase.  The rate of  creation  of  new  private  firms is 
determined  by  the  gap  between  the  productivity  of  workers,  their 
wage,  and the rate of taxation of workers. The wages  in turn depend  on 
both  unemployment  benefits  and  the  rate at which  workers  are being 
hired relative to the rate of unemployment.  Unemployment  benefits are Editorial  7 
financed  by taxes on workers. It is assumed  that there is an initial stock 
decline  in the size of the state sector. Therefore, the transition process is 
driven by the interactions  of wages,  unemployment  benefits,  taxes, and 
unemployment. 
While  the  rate of privatization  is initially  assumed  to be  exogenous, 
Aghion  and  Blanchard  later  endogenize  the  privatization  decision. 
They  use  alternative  models  of  the  firm's decision-making  process,  all 
based  on the potential  gains  to workers within  the firm. 
The  model  has  some  pessimistic  implications.  When  the  rate  of 
privatization  is assumed  to be exogenous,  there are multiple  equilibria, 
in one  of which  pessimism  breeds  a very  high  level  of unemployment. 
Aghion  and Blanchard believes  this corresponds  to a situation  in which 
foreign  and domestic  investment  is low because  of pessimism  about the 
country's  prospects.  In this  model,  high  unemployment  benefits  slow 
reform, both  by  raising wages  and  by  increasing  taxes on  labor. How- 
ever,  Aghion  and  Blanchard  believe  that  the  level  of  unemployment 
benefits  is  politically  constrained.  When  the  rate  of  privatization  is 
endogenized,  the existence  of high unemployment  becomes  an impedi- 
ment to restructuring. They argue that measures  to speed  private sector 
job creation, to reduce the rate of unemployment,  are more urgent  than 
measures  to accelerate the rate of privatization. 
The policy  conclusions  that Aghion  and  Blanchard are able to  draw 
establish  the value  of the  theoretical  framework.  The paper  will  surely 
generate  further research, building  on the  concluding  section  in which 
the authors list special assumptions  that should  be relaxed. 
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